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PREFACE
Public policy in the American states has attracted
the attention of an increasing number of political scientists
in recent times.

Many and varied kinds of studies have been

done to determine the relationships between factors in the
political environments of American states and the content
of the public policies of these states.

The results of these

studies vary as do the studies themselves.

More often than

not, the findings contradict each other.
One such contradiction is observed in the findings of
studies on the relationship between economic and political
factors within the political environment and state public
policy.

Some studies identify economic factors as the major

determinants of state public policy while others claim that
political factors play the major role in determining public
policy.
I observed an environmental factor that has not been
given sufficient attention in many of these controversial
studies.

Many researchers have not seriously considered

political culture as a possible prominent influence in the
makinq of state public policy.

The stimulus from this

discovery coupled with the curiosity to find out what lies
behind that of which little is known, impelled me to embark
upon this study that uses the path analytic technique and
ii

hypothesizes that political culture, vis-a-vis wealth and
political participation, makes the greatest impact on the
welfare policies of the states in the plains and southeastern
regions of America.
It was found that when the direct and indirect impacts
of independent variables

(political culture, wealth, and

political participation)

upon the dependent variable

(welfare)

are taken into account, none of these impacts equals that of
political culture.

Subsidiary hypotheses also show that

states with moralistic subcultures pay higher welfare
benefits than states with traditionalistic subcultures, and
that the difference in the amount of welfare benefits does
not stem primarily from differences in wealth.
Although the methodology employed in this study is open
to further refinement, it has shown the need to develop and
test causal relationships in the study of public policy in
American states.
I express my gratitude to Dr. James Johnson who gave
much of his time to encourage and direct me during this study
and to Professor Orville Menard and Dr. Phil Secret for their
invaluable advice and corrections.

I also thank my wife,

my mother-in-law, and my two sons for patiently enduring some
of the inconveniences which my devotion to this study brought
upon them,

iii
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INTRODUCTION
Thucydides speaking through the lips of Pericles once
said:
We are a free democracy . . . We do not allow
absorption in our own affairs to interfere with
participation in the city's.
We regard the man
who holds aloof from public affairs as useless? we
yield to none in independence of spirit and complete
self reliance.1
The above statement evokes two thoughts regarding
politics.

For one thing, politics, the art of making

scarce resources or values go around, has had a long history.
Secondly, the political culture of the Athenians, implicit
in the statement, dictated that every Athenian be a
practicing politician.

Although direct democracy does

not obtain in America today, or anywhere else for that
matter, the fact still remains that the political culture of
a people, an element of their general culture, influences
their political system and practice.
The concept of political culture was a latent given in
ancient political thought.

Political scientists have long

accepted such concepts as collective will, social contract,
constitutional concensus, and inherent values as concepts
^Edith Hamilton, The Echo of Greece
W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1957), pT 30.

1

(New York:

2
that "bespeak of a basic and implicit force in human
2
societies."
It is the discovery of the concept of
political culture that has shed some light upon this "latent
3
coherence m political life."
Besides shedding some light
on consistency in political life, political culture could
explain, to some extent, the processes of a particular
political system.

It becomes necessary, therefore, that the

study of political culture be not merely descriptive but
theoretically relevant and specific as to its application.
Lucian Pye implied that such specificity of application
served the useful purpose of making particular systems more
understandable when he said,
If studies of political culture were to converge
more with respect to key themes, then it would be
easier to judge the extent to which particular
studies have successfully added to our capacity to
understand particular systems.4
This thesis with its focus on political culture will
converge on a specific theme.

It seeks to explore the

influence political culture, vis-a-vis other environmental
factors

(wealth and political participation), has upon the

2

Lucian Pye, "Culture and Political Science:
Problems
in the Evaluation of the Concept of Political Culture," in
Louis Schneider and Charles M. Bonjean, eds., The Idea of
Culture in the Social Sciences
(Cambridge:
Cambridge
University Press, 19 73) , p~. 7 6 .
3Ibid.
Ibid., p. 75.

3
content of the welfare policies of the states in two U. S.
regions.

It is hoped that such a limited use of political

culture will add to our understanding of political life in
the states under investigation and especially to our
understanding of the impact of culture upon public policy.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Anthropological Concept of Culture
The word culture, in its anthropological meaning, was
established in the English language in 1871 by Edward Tylor
who borrowed the term from the German word, Kulture, meaning
cultivation or becoming cultured, which first appeared in a
5
German dictionary m 179 3.
But the ethnographic and
scientific uses of the word today are no longer restricted
to the idea of cultivation, but extends, instead, to the
idea of a condition that transcends human beings and in
which all human societies share, even though marked
differences exist among particular cultures.

g

Tylor does not claim originality to this modern
usage of culture.

The meaning is traced back to his mentor,

Gustav E. Klemm, who ascribed it to Voltaire.

We find an

early hint of political culture in Voltaire’s observation
of culture "as it manifested in customs, in beliefs, and
7
in forms of government."
5
w
'
A. L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn, Culture:
A
Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions
(New York:
Vintage Books, 1963), pp. 11, 13.
^Ibid., p. 14.
7Ibid.
4

5
The academic concept of culture originated, therefore,
from anthropology where it forms a kind of pivot upon which
the discipline revolves.

A. L. Kroeber gives the impression

that culture is what makes the anthropologist what he is
when he says that:
. . . the anthropologist . . . . if he wishes to
remain such, has necessarily to concern himself
first of all with that aspect and product of
human behavior— and reinfluence upon it— which is
usually called "culture".**
Almost as many definitions of culture exist as there
are anthropologists, suggesting how elusive the concept is.
Some scholars see culture as that human behavior which
distinguishes humans from animals.

Others use it

synonymously with civilization, in an ethnographic sense,
to mean that which embodies "knowledge, belief, art, morals,
law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired
9
by man as a member of society."
Besides Tylor's inclusive or general view of culture,
there is a pluralistic and relativistic view.

This view

sees culture as that mode of expressing thoughts and
actions which is peculiar to a group of people and which
8
A. L. Kroeber, The Nature of Culture (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1952), p. 104.
9
Edward B. Tylor, Primitive Culture:
Researches Into
the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Language,
Art and Custom (New York:
Parento's, 1924), p. 1.

6
sets their lifestyle apart from that of other groups of
i

people.

10

A. L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn have examined a
total of one hundred and sixty four definitions of culture
within the discipline of anthropology and have come up
with a definition they felt would satisfy various social
science disciplines.

In their words:

Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit,
of, and for behavior acquired and transmitted by
symbols, constituting the distinctive achievement
of human groups, including their embodiments in
artifacts:
the essential core of culture consists
of traditional (i.e. historically derived and
selected) ideas and especially their attached values;
culture systems may, on the one hand, be considered
as products of action, on the other as conditioning
elements of further a c t i o n . H
It is hard to say whether the above tortuous definition
of culture takes care of the problem of a cacophony of
definitions and explanations.

Bronislaw Malinowski has also

added his voice to the debate over the meaning of culture.
He suggests that defining or analysing culture from a
utilitarian or functional and organizational or institutional
stand-point will help anthropology lay a scientific
foundation for an empirical and theoretical study of culture.
By a functional aspect of culture he means the place of
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences/
1968 e d . , s.v. "Cultural Anthropology" by David G.
Mandelbaum.
"^Kroeber and Kluckhohn, p. 357.

7
culture in enabling human beings to satisfy or meet their
organic or basic needs such as "feeding, heating, housing,
clothing, or protection from cold, wind, and weather."

12

His concept of organization or institution implies that
human beings bind themselves together, agreeing to obey
some stated norms and to work within their natural and
artificial environment in order to satisfy their desires.
He, however, points out that all cultures are not the same.
Differences exist in cultures and these account for
differences in such things as institutions which, actually,
are means of addressing "some highly specialized need or
values."

13

Malinowski's concept is a variant of the

pluralistic and relativistic view mentioned earlier.

The

implication here is, even though all cultural patterns
"crystallize around the same foci," ^

various groups of

people have cultures that help them meet common human needs
in different ways.
The ideas gained from the pluralistic and relativistic
views of culture, particularly the functional and
institutional aspects, are attractive to the discipline of
political science.

Given a statement such as the following,

12

Bronislaw Malinowski, A Scientific Theory of Culture:
And Other Essays
(Chapel Hill:
The University of North
Carolina Press, 1944), pp. 36-40.
■^Ibid. , p . 40 .
14

Kroeber and Kluckhohn, p. 349.

8
the attraction increases:
All cultures constitute so many somewhat distinct
answers to essentially the same questions posed
by human biology and by the generalities of human
situation . . . Every society's patterns for living
must provide approved and sanctioned ways for
dealing with such universal circumstances as the
existence of two sexes; the helplessness of infants;
the need for satisfaction of the elementary
biological requirements such as food, warmth, and
sex; the presence of individuals of different ages
and of differing physical and other capabilities.-^
The attraction this statement has for the writer does not
lie in its uniqueness

(it is after all another way of

expressing what Malinowski said earlier) but in the
elements it contains which read like politics itself.
Political Culture
Political science has always borrowed ideas from other
disciplines, but was slow in incorporating the concept of
culture.

The need to study political behavior more closely,

opened the doors of political science to the concept of
culture.

Many Americans felt the need to study other

people's cultures for military and political purposes
during World War II, thus hastening the acceptance of
culture into the political science discipline.

However,

the concept of political culture was not fully formulated
until about ten years after World War II when Gabriel Almond
used it for the first time in 1956.
■^Ibid. , p.
16

348.

Pye, pp. 65-66.

16

His intention was

to compare world political systems with the aid of "certain
sociological and anthropological concepts."

17

He defined a

political system as "a set of interacting roles . . . ,"
a concept he said had an advantage over such concepts as
institutions, organizations, or groups in the sense that "it
is a more inclusive and more open concept."

People in a

particular political system have particular patterns of
orientation to political action, constituting what he called
political culture. 18
Almond's view of political culture intruded into areas
which political scientists reserved for "attitudes towards
politics," "public opinion," "political ideology," "political
values," "national character," and "national ethos."

He

emphasized, though, that political culture did not "coincide
with a given political system or society" and that it was not
tantamount to the general culture.

19

Most political scientists borrow their concept of
political culture from Almond.

Sidney Verba writing later

defined political culture as "the system of empirical
beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which define the
situation in which political action takes place."

20

The

17

Gabriel A. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems,"
Journal of PoliticsT 18 (August 1956):1.
^ I b i d . , p. 396.
19Ibid.
20

Sidney Verba, "Comparative Political Culture," in
Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, ed., Political Culture and
Political Deve1opment
(Princeton:
Princeton University
Press, 1965), p. 513.

10
definition contained in the International Encyclopedia of
Social Sciences, which came still later, stresses the
subjective and psychological aspects of political culture,
observing that it is not the same as the general culture;
it is quite distinct and separate from it.
Political culture is the set of attitudes, beliefs,
and sentiments which give order and meaning to
political process and which provide the underlying
assumptions and rules that govern behavior in the
political ideals and the operating norms of policy.
Political culture is thus the manifestation in
aggregate form of the psychological and subjective
dimensions of politics.21
The utility of political culture, its value and its
potential are determined, to a large extent, by how political
scientists use it.
the individual

Some have applied the concept, first to

(a micro analysis) and then to the polity

(a macro analysis).

They borrowed this approach from

Freudian psychology which extrapolated from the individual
to the society.

Cultural anthropologists have tended also

to stress this Freudian idea, holding that " . . .

the

collective culture and individual personalities mirror
each other."

22

Heinz Eulau spoke against what he called fallacies
that were creeping into the discipline of political science
by way of the micro-macro problem.

He maintained that the

21

International Encyclopedia of Social Science, 1968
ed., s.v., "Political Culture," by Lucian W. Pye.
22

Pye, "Culture and Political Science:
Problems in the
Evaluation of the Concept of Political Culture," in Schneider
and Bonjean (Eds.), pp. 69-70.

11
ultimate units of action which are politically significant
are "groups, associations, organizations, communities,
states, and other collectivities,"

23

even though concrete

political decisions are made by individuals.

Eulau favored,

therefore, the concept that gave prominence to macro analysis
over micro analysis.

Some political scientists feel that the

way to solve the micro-macro tension is to extend the findings
on the micro level to the macro level by treating individuals
or small units as analogues of the larger group or unit.

On

the other hand, others feel that the problem is solved by
attributing to the individual or the small unit that which
holds for the group or the larger unit.

Eulau condemns such

analysis as the fallacy of personification.

He discourages

its use within the discipline of political science, arguing
that the fallacy gave rise to the grotesque descriptions of
"national character.
Harold Lasswell, like Eulau, rejects the extrapolation
from the micro to the macro levels.

He insists that the

collective system is a basic assumption or a given and that
it consists of roles which could reflect the personalities
of those who assume these roles.

25

What he says, in effect,

is that political institutions or organs are larger than
23

International Encyclopedia of Social Science, 1968
ed., s.v., "Political Behavior," by Heinz Eulau.

25

Harold Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics
(Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1930).

12

and distinct from persons who occupy offices within them
and so it would be wrong to extend to the institution or
organ that which is true of the individual.

The best

reconciliation of the micro-macro tension is found in the
concept of political socialization.

Political scientists

suggest that political socialization helps "political
systems maintain their continuity and individuals learn how
26
to perform appropriate political roles."
Lucian Pye suggests that political culture be used in
a system oriented way to explain a particular system or
general categories of systems as Almond and Verba did in
27
The Civic Culture.
It is in this system oriented way that
political culture is used in this thesis in order to explain
political behavior in the particular systems of selected
American states.
The Utility of Models
Before discussing political culture in the context of
political processes in these states, political process will
26

27

Pye, "Culture and Political Science...," pp. 69-70.

Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture:
Political Attitude and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1963).
The theoretical concern
of Almond and Verba was to explain that democratic stability
was contingent upon a generalized "civic culture."
They
tested the theory in a sample of five nations— Britain, the
U.S., Germany, Italy, and Mexico.
They found that the "Civic
Culture" necessary for the stability of Democracy, was more
prevalent in Britain and the U.S., than in the other
countries.

13
be explained briefly using David Easton's system analysis
model.

Models help us to visualize or conceptualize that

which does not lend itself to an easy comprehension.
According to Thomas Dyef models:
. . . should order and simplify our thinking about
politics . . . the utility of a model lies in its
ability to simplify political life so that we can
think about it more clearly and understand the
relationships which we find in the real world.
Yet, too much simplification may lead to inaccuracies
in our thinking about r e a l i t y . 2 o
Any model that deserves the name must correspond with
reality; that is, items in it must be relevant to reality
so that it could verify reality.

29

Paul Meadows agrees

with the observation of the biologist, L. J. Henderson, that
"all forms of activity manifest themselves" in systems.

30

System is said to be the master model and it is expected to
explain political life better than most other models.

These

are reasons enough for its use in explaining the political
process that is related to this study.
Every political system— local, state, national or
international— operates within an environment, usually
28

Thomas R. Dye, Politics, Economics, and the Public:
Policy Outcomes in the American States
(Chicago:
Rand
McNally and Co., 1966), pp. 2-3.
29

Paul Meadows, "Models, Systems, and Science,"
American Sociological Review 22, No. 1, (February 1975) :4.

14
divided into intrasocietal and extrasocietal environments.
The intrasocietal environment in turn consists of ecological,
biological, social, and personality systems.

These could be

subdivided into such systems as cultural, social, economic,
and demographic systems.

31

The extrasocietal environment,

which consists of the international society or the
suprasociety, is not very germane to this thesis which
investigates the impact of cultural, political, and economic
factors upon the welfare policies of some American states.
In other words, the study is concerned primarily with the
intrasocietal aspect of the political environment which often
influences every stage of the political input-output
32
process.
According to Easton,

33

the political system, as an

open system, reacts or responds to factors or influences
within its environment, otherwise known as environmental
disturbances.

These disturbances are communicated through

inputs and "withinputs."
and demands.

Inputs consist mainly of supports

Supports, as the name implies, consist of

the actions of people involved in the political process which
are favorable to those who authoritatively allocate values.
31

David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life
(New York:
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965), pp. 20-22.
32

David R. Berman, State and Local Politics
Holbrook Press, Inc., 1975), p. 4.
33

Easton, p. 57.

(Boston:

15
Obeying rules or laws made by those in authority is an
example of support.

Demands, on the other hand, impose

strains upon the political system and when they become
excessive, can undermine the ability of the system to
process its inputs into outputs.

"Withinputs" are those

demands which do not stem from the environment but from
within the political system itself.

A demand to remedy

the inequality in district representation is an example
of withinput, because it is inspired from within the
system.34
The inputs and "withinputs" go through a conversion
process within the political system to yield outputs in the
form of authoritative decisions such as public policies.
Easton is not very clear on what takes place within the
"box," that is, the processes that go on within the
political system.

But Richard Dawson and James Robinson

attempt to summarize this phase of the systems model thus:
Process, as activity and interaction between the
variables and components within system, in turn
gives rise to the formulation and implementation of
public policy.
Policy in this context is the
outcome of activity or interaction among external
conditions, political system, and political
process.35
34

David Easton, "The Analysis of Political Systems,"
in Roy Macridis and Bernard E. Brown, eds. , Comparative
Politics:
Notes and Readings
(Homewood:
The Dorsey
Press, 1977), p. 98.
35

Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson,
"Inter-Party Competition, Economic Variables, and Welfare
Policies in the American States," The Journal of Politics
2 (May 1963):266.

16
The output or policy is fed back into the environment
where it would either satisfy the demands of a segment of
the public, or be challenged by an unsatisfied portion of
the same public.

It is hard to find a policy that commands

a universal acceptance in any political community.

The

output could also give rise to new and related demands.
The feedback lets the authorities know the state of affairs
in the system and so helps them to run the system so as to
cope with stress.

Any interference with the feedback

hinders the ability of the authorities to take necessary
action if and when it is needed to keep support for the
system at the desirable level.

36

Items in Easton*s model— input, process, output, and
feedback— are relevant to this investigation.

For example,

political culture, the primary variable to be tested, is
believed to have a dynamic influence on the whole gamut
of the political system of American states; it is suspected
to regulate input demands and the political interactions
that go on within the system and to influence the feedback
process by influencing the conversion of outputs into new
. .
.
37
or modified inputs.
36

David Easton, The Political System;
An Inquiry into
the State of Political Science
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1953), p. 152.
37

Samuel C. Patterson, "The Political Culture of the
American States," The Journal of Politics
30 (February
1969):190-191.

17
Elazar's Categorization
A number of policy studies have been done which
implicitly or explicitly used Easton's systems analysis
as a model.

The interest in political culture as a

significant variable in such studies has increased, especially
since Elazar produced his seminal work on the political
subcultures of the American states.

38

Borrowing Almond's conceptualization of political
culture, Elazar has identified three different subcultures
within the overall American culture.

People within these

subcultures differ in the way they view, among other
things, government intervention in the political community
by Way of initiation and execution of welfare programs.
"The political culture of a given area affects the way
its citizens and public officials perceive conditions,
structure institutions, and go about solving problems." 39
Even though the constitutions of American states "differ
little from each other,"40 the imprint of their political
cultures is often found in those areas where they differ.
Some states in the South with the type of political culture
that favors elitism, make provisions in their constitutions
that subtly but effectively limit suffrage.
38

Daniel J. Elazar, American Federalism:
A View from
the States, (New York:
Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1972),
39_.
»
Be rman, p . 7.
40

John D. Hicks, "The Constitutions of the Northwest
States," The University Studies of the University of Nebraska
Vol. 23 (Lincoln:
The University of Nebraska, 1924) , p"I 32.

18
Elazar believes also that political culture is one of
the three factors that influence political life in the
American states.
. . . three overriding factors appear to be especially
important in shaping the individual state's political
structures, electoral behavior, and modes of
organization for political action.
They are political
culture— the pattern of orientation to political
action in which each political system is embedded;
^
sectionalism . . .; and the continuing frontier . . . .
Elazar's categorization of subcultures in the American
states is based mainly on ethnic origin and religious
affiliations of the early settlers.

The settlement

patterns of the various groups that made up the original
American colonies established the foundation for the three
subcultures Elazar identified.

With time, the migratory

patterns of the settlers spread these subcultures as they
appear today, across various areas of the United States.
But the passage of time and what Elazar calls the effect
of "externally generated events" have led to the erosion,
intensification or modification of the cultural patterns,
"to make each local situation even more complex."

42

This

probably explains the existence of cultural variation or
mutations that have made it difficult to find any state
today that completely represents an ideal cultural type.
41
42

Elazar, pp. 84-85.
Ibid., p. 104.

19
Explaining the subcultural patterns of the U.S. in
terms of the frontier, Elazar identifies the "rural land
frontier" as the period during which the basic political
patterns were set as the immigrants moved in three great
waves, starting at the East coast and ending at the West.
This explanation has a religious element to it also.

The

Puritans, starting from the northern part of the nation,
headed westward leaving their imprint in the New England
areas, New York state, northern Pennsylvania, the upper
part of Ohio, the upper Great Lakes and the upper Mississippi
Valley.

Immigrants from Scandinavia and northern Europe

who had traditions similar to those of the Puritans joined
them.

Moving westward, they settled in Oregon, Washington,

California, Utah (as Mormons), Kansas
Colorado, Montana, and Arizona.

(as Abolitionists),

Elazar calls the subculture

these groups developed the "moralistic" subculture.
But groups with different religious and ethnic
background, primarily people "from non-Puritan England" and
the interior parts of Germany, settled in the middle of the
nation, covering areas of New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, and Maryland.

These groups sought:

. . . to develop pluralistic societies dedicated to
individual freedom to pursue private goals, to the
point of making religion a private matter, an
unheard-of step at the t i m e . ^
43Ibid., p. 109.

20
They moved towards the West, crossing Pennsylvania into the
central parts of Ohio,

Indiana, and Illinois.

They finally

settled in northern California and populated the areas
in between, including areas of Nebraska, South Dakota,
Missouri, Wyoming, and Nevada.

Some of the areas the

pluralistic groups populated had elements of the other
subcultures, but the subcultures which became dominant in
these areas is termed the "individualistic" subculture.
Those who settled in the southern states sought the
kind of opportunity their counterparts just described had.
The difference between the two groups is that those in the
North sought their "individual" opportunity in commerce,
while those in the South concentrated their efforts on a
plantation-centered agriculture— a kind of feudal system
with slavery as its base.

Elazar calls the subculture that

developed in the South "traditionalistic."

The political

activity of the community revolved around the new elite-those with landed property whose relationship with the rest
of the population was in terms of noblesse oblige.

The

slaves were completely excluded from any form of
participation in the political process.
Elazar observed that the Rocky Mountains— the great
mountain system of America— helped to diffuse cultural
patterns because they stood in the way of the East-West
movement.

In some places, the traditionalistic and

moralistic strains mingled.

Another type of synthesis or

21
mixing of subcultures that developed was brought about by
what Elazar calls the urban-industrial frontier, which
produced a group of immigrants from Ireland, Italy, Central
and Eastern Europe, and the Balkans.

These immigrants, who

came with a traditionalistic culture, picked :up
individualistic cultural attitudes as they settled the
cities, implying that the urban industrial areas of the
U.S. have predominantly an individualistic subculture.
The American political culture today is, therefore,
made up of mixtures of the moralistic, individualistic,
and traditionalistic subcultures.
. . . each subculture is strongly tied to specific
sections of the country, reflecting the streams and
currents of migration that have carried people of
different origins and backgrounds across the
continent (America) in more or less orderly
patterns.^4
Elazar's identification of these patterns of dominant
subcultures for each state, and even within it was not
arrived at by empirical means.

As Ira Sharkansky points

out, the designations reflect Elazar*s "own judgment,
disciplined by several years of observation."

45

But his

judgment and observation regarding the political
characteristics of the subcultures have been confirmed in a
44
45

Ibid., p. 93.

Ira Sharkansky, "The Utility of Elazar*s Political
Culture:
A Research Note," Polity 2 (Fall 1969):67-68.
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number of studies.

46

Elazar1s three main subcultures are

shown in the table on the following page.
Each political subculture possesses political
characteristics peculiar to it and by which its political
perceptions and practices are determined.
In the moralistic political subculture, politics is
seen as a positive endeavor for community improvement.
All members of the community are encouraged to participate
in the political process and the political community
expects a healthy struggle for power and a high standard
of morality from the occupants of public office.

47

Of

the three political subcultures, the moralistic subculture
appears to be the most open even though political
46

See Russell Hanson, "Political Culture, Interparty
Competition and Political Efficacy in the American States,"
Publius (Spring 1980):17-35; Nicholas Lovrich, Byron
Daynes, and Laura Ginger, "Public Policy and the Effects
of Historical - Cultural Phenomena:
The Case of Indiana,"
Publius (Spring 1980):111-125; Richard A. Joslyn,
Manifestations of Elazar's Political Subcultures:
State
Public Opinion and the Content of Political Campaign
Advertising," Publius (Spring 1980):37-58; Albert J. Nelson,
"Political Culture and Women's Representation in Lower State
Legislative Chambers:
19 71 and 197 7," International Journal
of Intercultural Relations, 8 (1980):367-377; Susan Welch
and John G. Peters, "State Political Culture and the Attitudes
of State Senators Toward Social Economic Welfare and
Corruption Issue," Publius (Spring 1980):59-67.
These
studies are discussed under "Review of Past Studies."
47

Elazar, pp. 96-98.
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Table I
The Distribution of Elazar1s Political
Subcultures Among American States

Moralistic
Subculture

Traditionalistic
Subculture

Individualistic
Subculture

California

Alabama

Alaska

Colorado

Arizona

Connecticut

Idaho

Arkansas

Delaware

Iowa

Florida

Hawaii

Kansas

Georgia

Illinois

Maine

Kentucky

Indiana

Michigan

Louisiana

Maryland

Minnesota

Mississippi

Massachusetts

Montana

New Mexico

Missouri

New Hampshire

North Carolina

Nebraska

North Dakota

Oklahoma

Nevada

Oregon

South Carolina

New Jersey

South Dakota

Tennessee

New York

Utah

Texas

Ohio

Vermont

Virginia

Pennsylvania

Washington

West Virginia

Rhode Island

Wisconsin
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intolerance resulting from religious convictions could at
times create a problem.
A different kind of problem exists in the
traditionalistic political subculture.

Real political

power is confined to "a relatively small and selfperpetuating group drawn from an established elite who often
inherit 'their right1 to govern through family ties and
social position.”

48

Even though people in this political

subculture see government as existing for the good of the
community, they favor a political style that seeks to
maintain the status quo.

Those who engage in politics in

this subculture are expected to gain from their participation
but not necessary in monetary terms.

Political parties and

political competition do not count for much, a fact that
held true in the Southern states where the traditionalistic
subculture predominantes.
The individualistic political subculture has its
own problem also.

Most people in this subculture "believe

that politics is a dirty— if necessary— business, better
left to those who are willing to soil themselves by
engaging in it."

49

> Two norms exist in this subculture

with respect to what the public expects from those in
public office.
48
49

The higher norm dictates that public office

Ibid., p. 99.
Ibid., p . 95.
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holders benefit from their office in return for providing
high quality government services.

But the lower norm

expects them to serve themselves and those who help elect
them into office.

Corruption among public office holders

in the individualistic political subculture shocks
people only if it is corruption of an extraordinary
dimension.

The subculture resembles the traditionalistic

subculture somewhat in the sense of its reluctance to
expand government functions.

When it does expand these

functions, it is usually in response to an anticipated quid
pro quo— a reward for the public that elected the official(s)
into office.

But unlike the traditionalistic subculture, the

individualistic subculture "encourages the maintenance of
a party system that is competitive, but not overly so,
in the pursuit of office."

50

The utility of the concept of culture which culminates
in political culture and particularly in Elazar's subcultural
categorization is measured by the many and varied studies
in politics that employ this concept.

Even Elazar himself

feels satisfied to see "the intellectual product of his
formulation and . . . the successful testing of it by
others."

51

A review of these studies will perhaps justify

Elazar's reason for feeling satisfied, but more importantly
^ Ib i d . , p. 88.
51

Daniel J. Elazar, "Afterward:
Steps in the Study of
American Political Culture," Publius (Spring 1980):127.
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it will provide the next logical step in this
investigation.

REVIEW OF PAST STUDIES
Students of American state politics have done a
number of comparative studies that "have employed political
culture as an explanatory variable to account for interstate
differences in political structure, electoral behavior, and
52
policy outputs."
Sharkansky tested political culture as an independent
variable against twenty three variables grouped into three
categories:

(1) political participation,

(2) the size and

perquisites of the bureaucracy, and (3) the scope,
magnitude, costs, and innovative character of government
53
programs.
His results showed that about two thirds of the
twenty three dependent variables correlated with Elazar1s
scale of political subcultures.

The relationships between

political culture and some of the measures of political
participation were strongest and most consistent.
Brian Fry and Richard Winters,

54

even though their

study did not deal with political culture directly, concluded
52__
._
Hanson, p. 17.
53

Sharkansky, pp. 73-74.

54

Brian R. Fry and Richard J. Winters, "The Politics
of Redistribution," American Political Science Review 64
(June 1970):508-522.
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that political variables make a stronger impact upon ;
redistributive public policy than socioeconomic variables.
But Eric

Uslaner and Ronald Weber

55

focused attention

on an aspect

that is not commonly tested in policy studies.

They assumed

that in making policies, policy makers respond

to the preferences of someone.

They posited that, after

all, the preferences that make the greatest impact upon
public policies are those of the people who make the
policies.
indirectly.

Political culture figures into their study
They reasoned that the decision makers would

feel the impact of public opinion which in turn would be
influenced by:
. . . environmental factors such as "political
culture"
(which) are likely to mediate the
impact of public opinion on the party system.
A more liberal political culture should produce
a legislative setting more hospitable to
redistributive legislation.
Such a setting
would include a more professionalized legislature
and a greater degree of intergarty conflict
within the legislative arena.
Charles Johnson

57

carried out a study that supported

Elazar*s findings that the American political subcultures
55

Eric M. .Uslaner and Ronald E. Weber, "The Politics
of Redistribution:
Toward a Model of the Policy - Making
Process in the American States," American Politics Quarterly
3, No. 2 (April 1975):130-169.
56Ibid., p. 135.
57

Charles Johnson, "Political Culture in American
States:
Elazar*s Formulation Examined," American Journal
of Political Science 20, No. 3 (August 1976):491-509.
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stem from itiigration streams of the early settlers.

He

used religious affiliation census figures as "tags" for the
political subcultures and he used these to trace Elazar"s
migration streams.

Grouping the states according to the

three subcultures, using discriminant analysis, he found
that his results tallied with Elazar's findings.

He then

tested the relationship between political culture and each
of a total of eight state political characteristics.
Controlling for socioeconomic variables, he found that
political culture had a significant relationship with six
of the eight variables.
In a study to test the correlation between Elazar's
political subcultures and state public opinion and the
content of political advertising, Richard Joslyn 5 8 found
that the variation of public opinion across the U.S. was
consistent with Elazar's subcultural patterns.

Citizens

in states with the moralistic subculture tended to
participate more in the politics of their state and to be
more open toward government intervention than citizens in
states with individualistic or traditionalistic subcultures.
Government intervention as used by Joslyn is akin to the
measure of government welfare policy, welfare payments,
used in this thesis.
58Joslyn.
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Political culture was also found to be relevant to
women's representation in lower state legislative houses
in Albert Nelson's

59

study.

His results confirmed that

perceptions of politics or political participation— who
should or should not participate in the political process—
perceptions born out of political subculture are factors
that affect women's representation, since "role expectations
60
in the larger society have a profound impact on behavior."
Nelson found that women have a greater chance to participate
in politics in the moralistic subculture than in the
individualistic and traditionalistic subcultures.
He warned, however, that the percentage of women's
representation was still low in the U.S. even by the
moralistic subcultural standard.

His observation is

supported by David Hill's later findings that "the traditions
and cultures of some states may cause female representation
to lag behind popular support for women's full participation
in political affairs."

61

^Nelson.
60

Ibid., p. 369.
Role expectation is a product of
socialization.
It will be remembered that Pye associated
political socialization with political culture when he
observed that political socialization has been introduced
by some political scientists to help ease the micro-macro
tension encountered in the area of political behavior.
See
Lucian W. Pye, "Culture and Political Science:
Problems
in the evaluation of the concept of political culture,"
in Schneider and Bonjean (eds.).
61
David Hill, "Political Culture and Female Political
Representation," The Journal of Politics, 43 (1980):168.
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Most of the past studies mentioned do not deal directly
with the relationship between political culture and public
policy.

One thing, however, is clear.

Political culture

is a variable that cannot be ignored in policy studies.
Even though many of these studies do not deal expressly
with public policy, by implication their results predict
a relationship between political culture and public policy.
One such study is th&t done by Susan Welch and John Peters.
Among other things, they found that "elites from the
moralistic political culture are more likely to be liberal
63
on the social and economic welfare issues . . . ."
Another study that implies the relationship between
political culture and public policy demonstrated "how the
study of political culture can be used to improve our
understanding of policy phenomenon."

64

Nicholas Lovrich

Byron Daynes, and Laura Ginger, in their study of public
policy and the effects of historical-cultural phenomenon in
Indiana counties,

found that political culture was a stronger

predictor of more of the variables than socioeconomic
status conditions, urban/rural characteristics, and
political party orientation.

But on welfare policies, none

of the variables including political culture was found to
demonstrate a significant relationship.
62

Welch and Peters.

6.1
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m

Ibid., p. 64.

Lovrich, Daynes, and Ginger, p. 115.

One study that establishes a clear relationship between
political culture and public policy is John Harrigan's.

65

He observed that the wealth of a state is related to its
Aid to Families with Dependent Children

(AFDC) payment.

But he argued that New York, for example, whose AFDC payment
is eight times more than that of Mississippi is not eight
times more affluent than that state.

He, therefore,

concluded that affluence does not completely explain the
difference in the levels of the welfare programs or benefits
of states.

"The political culture of states also helps

explain the difference in welfare benefits."^

In the

light of Elazar*s characteristics of the American political
subcultures,

it is no surprise that Harrigan found that the

states with moralistic subcultures proved to be more liberal
in their AFDC payments than states with individualistic or
traditionalistic political subcultures,

the latter being

the least liberal.
Harrigan's study is related to the earlier studies
of both Valdimer Key

67

and Duane Lockard.

68

Key suggested
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John J. Harrigan, Politics and Policy m States and
Communities
(Boston:
Little, Brown and Co., 1980), p. 233.
^Ib i d . , p. 235.
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Nation

Valdimer O. Key, Southern Politics:
(New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1949).

In State and

✓

68

Duane Lockard, New England State Politics
Princeton University Press^ 19^9).

(Princeton
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that in the Southern states, one factor of political culture,
party system, resulted in lack of party competition,

for

the absence of effective participation by the citizenry
eliminated the need for political leaders to compete for
votes.

As a result, such redistributive policies as

education, welfare, health, and other social service
expenditures were low.

Later Lockard came to a similar

conclusion when he studied the politics of the New England
states

(Vermont, New Hampshire, Maine, Massachusetts,

Connecticut, and Rhode Island), and discovered that
"the internal structures of the parties within a state can
have the most far-reaching implications for the kind of
policy orientation of the state government."

69

He

divided the states into one-party and two-party states,
suggesting that lack of competition in the one-party states
explained the reason welfare programs were less generous
in those states.
But m

196 3, Richard Dawson and James Robinson

70

contradicted Key and Lockard by asserting that socioeconomic
factors influenced the content of public policy-more than
did political factors.

Dye,

71

in 1966, supported their view

in his comprehensive analysis of public policy in the
69
70

Ibid., p. 324*
Dawson and Robinson, pp. 265-2 89.

American states.

He concluded that the competitive states

were usually more affluent than the noncompetitive states and
so public policy differences between them might not be as
a result of party competition per se.

These past studies,

their results, and conclusions help create the basis on
which this study is built.

PROBLEM STATEMENT
Rationale for the Study
The Dawson-Robinson and Dye studies are examples of
the many research efforts that have concentrated on the
correlation between the wealth of states and the content
of their public policies.

As was observed earlier, these

studies conclude that wealth or affluence and not political
factors is more likely to explain public policy differences
among the states.

72

Dye and Virginia Gray also stress this

conclusion saying that,
. . . a number of empirical studies had suggested
that economic development (income, urbanization,
and industrialization) had a more important impact
on public policy, including welfare policy, than
participation or competition.73
Using the path analytic technique, Gary Tompkins has
come up with a finding that tends to contradict the above
conclusions.
path analysis,
72

He developed a causal model, testing it with
74

which showed no direct path between income

Dawson and Robinson, also Dye.

73

. . .
.
Thomas R. Dye and Virginia Gray, The Determinants of
Public Policy
(Lexington:
Lexington Books, 1980), p. 11.
74

The method of path analysis or path coefficients was
first used by the geneticist Sewell Wright as early as 1918
to help him in a quantitative study of genetics.
It is a
causal interpretation of statistical relationships which
has been extensively used by sociologists since Wright
35
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and welfare benefit when ethnicity was added to the model.
Tompkins has, therefore, used "a path analytic model to
suggest that neither income nor competition-participation
is as important in determining welfare benefits as
ethnicity."75
Since Tompkins found ethnicity to be associated with
a distinctive political culture,

76

and could be used as a

crude measure of culture under certain conditions, and
since reliable

77

state-by-state measures of political culture

developed it.
But recently, political scientists have been
attracted to its usefulness.
Some of them have used it in
producing more realistic and accurate results of the inter
actions (direct and indirect) among variables by sorting
out significant causal sequences.
See Otis Dudley Duncan,
"Path Analysis:
Sociological Examples,” in H. M. Blalock,
ed., Causal Models in the Social Sciences
(New York:
Aldine-Arton, 1971), pp. 115-138.
75

Dye and Gray, p. 11.
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Gary Tompkins, "A Causal Model of State Welfare
Expenditure," Journal of Politics
37 (1975):339-400.
77 Charles Johnson constructed indices of moralistic,
individualistic, and traditionalistic political cultures,
using religious affiliation information derived from census
data for each state.
"Discriminant analysis grouping the
states according to the three cultural indices produced
results quite congruent with the classification set forth
by Elazar."
See Charles Johnson's "Political Culture
in American States:
Elazar's Fbrmulation Examined,'Vi
American Journal of Political Science 20 (August 3, 1976):
50 7. Lovrich, Daynes, and Ginger classified the ninetytwo counties of Indiana into political categories based
on historical patterns of migration and settlement.
They
tested their categorization with voting behavior in the
counties and found statistically significant differences
in voting behavior among the traditionalistic, individualistic
and moralistic counties.
Their finding confirms the utility
of Elazar's political cultural categorization.
The above
studies attest to the reliability of Elazar's cultural
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are now available, the writer decided to test the relative
impact of political culture, wealth, and political
participation on welfare policies of states with different
political cultures.

The investigation is expected to produce

results similar to those which Tompkins obtained for
ethnicity.

That is, the writer hypothesizes that political

culture will explain more of the variation in state welfare
expenditures than will either wealth or political
participation.
Objective of the Study
The main objective of this study is to determine the
relative impact of political culture, political participation
and wealth upon the welfare policies of the states within the
Plains and Southeastern regions of America.

More

specifically, the study seeks to confirm the hypothesis
that political culture as designated by Elazar and modified
by Sharkansky, makes a greater impact upon the public
policies of the states in the two regions under investigation
than the other two variables, using a path analytic technique.

categorization; that is states conform to the pattern
suggested by Elazar even when their cultures are measured
by these other criteria considered more objective than
Elazar1s.

METHODOLOGY
This comparative study goes beyond tracing associations
among independent and dependent variables.

It tries to test

the causal linkages of a specific causal model

78
— a four-

variable causal model.
Hypotheses
Null
Political subculture makes an insignificant impact on
the welfare policies of the states in the Plains and
Southeastern regions of the U.S., when compared to the impact
made by wealth and political participation.
Research
The impact of political subculture on the content of
welfare policies of the states in the Plains and Southeastern
regions of the U.S. exceeds that of wealth or political
participation.
Subsidiary to the main hypothesis are two
subhypotheses:
Subhypothesis 1
The states that have moralistic

(M) political

subcultures will likely pay higher welfare benefits than
78
Dye and Gray, p. 10.
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states with traditionalistic (T) political
subcultures.
Subhypothesis 2
Political culture will likely have a greater impact
on political participation than wealth will.
The main hypothesis and the second subsidiary
hypothesis derive from the four-variable system mentioned
earlier, which is discussed further below— see Figure 1.
P

Path of
c ;p

Path of
w *p

Path
of
p- a

Path of
c- a

P
C
A
W

=
=
==
=

Path of
' w* a

Political Participation (voter turnout)
Political Culture
Welfare (AFDC)
Wealth (per capita income in constant (1972) dollars)

Figure 1.

The Hypothetical Path Model of Culture, Wealth
Participation and Welfare
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The dependent variable is welfare policy while wealth,
political participation and political cultre are the
independent variables.
the arrows)

The model assumes

(as indicated by

that wealth, political participation and political

culture, each makes a direct impact on welfare.

Apart from

having a direct impact on welfare, wealth and political
culture make indirect impacts on welfare through their impact
on political participation.
To obtain the total effects of the impacts of the
independent variables on the dependent variable it is
necessary to add together the direct effects and the indirect
effects as mediated through political participation.

The

direct effects are measured by standardized regression
coefficients

(betas) between each independent variable

and welfare expenditures.

The indirect effects are measured

by the betas between wealth and culture as independent
variables and participation treated as a dependent variable.
Therefore, the effect of political culture is beta c-a +
(beta c-p x beta p-a) and the effect of wealth is beta
w-a + (beta w-p x beta p-a).
on p.

(See the hypothetical model

39.)
As indicated earlier and as shown above, this study

does not merely show the association among the variables,
but reveals the magnitude of these associations.

It goes

still a step further to measure the total effects of these
variables by taking intervening variables into account
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through the use of the statistical technique of path
analysis.
Sample
The study uses states as the unit of analysis and
regions as the unit of selection.

The regions have been

chosen on the assumption that regions that are far removed
from one another are likely to possess some cultural,
economic, and political differences and therefore, will
provide easier and clearer comparisons.

By the same token,

states that are within the same region will likely have more
in common than states in different regions.

Sociologists,

economists, planners, and political scientists see regions
as the right units upon which to base the administration
of hhtion^l programs and so have recommended their use for
this purpose to the federal government.

79

Sharkansky observes

that,
Regions in America have their peculiarities in
politics and public policies.
Most regions were
settled by people from a common stream of migration
who have left their imprint on the politics and
public policies of such regions.®^
His observation resembles the reasoning behind Elazar1s
categorization of the political subcultures.

The

distinctiveness of these regions are, therefore, germane to
79

Ira Sharkansky, Regionalism In American Politics
(Indianapolis:
The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1970), p. 5.
^^Ibid., pp. 3-4.
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this investigation, which draws its sample of states from
the Plains and Southeastern regions.

81

Operational Definition
Political Culture
The original numerical values assigned to Elazar's
political subcultures taken as a continuum are as follows:
M

MT

1

2

MI
3

IM
4

I
5

IT
6

TI
7

TM
8

82

T

9

where the first letter signifies the primary subculture
and the second, the secondary subculture.

83

But Elazar

assigns numerous separate subcultures to various areas of
81

Ibid., pp.26-27.
The Plains region consists of
Iowa,
Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and
South Dakota, while Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia make up
the Southeastern region.
82

Elazar, in American Federalism:
A View from the
States, p. 117, has no place for MT and the position he gives
TM is after T instead of before T. But he later included MT
(See Elazar's "Afterward:
Steps in the Study of American
Political Culture," pp. 129-130) and endorsed the use of
a T-M-I continuum rather than an M-I-T continuu, indicating
a preference for a triangular relationship between political
subcultures as against a linear one.
He said that this
triangular relationship, a revised form of his former
circular continuum, "would allow for greater flexibility
in ordering subcultural responses depending on the issue
at hand."
The writer prefers Sharkansky*s modification
of Elazar*s numeral values used as an M-I-T continuum to
Elazar*s T-M-I continuum.
®3Ibid., pp. 106-107.
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the states of America.

84

He also has another designation

which he calls the "dominant political culture, by state,"
derived from the numerous separate subcultures.

85

This means

that each state would have two different subcultural values—
one being the mean of the separate subcultures and the other,
the value of the dominant political subculture Elazar assigns
to each state.

86

Based on Elazar*s numerous intrastate

designations of subcultures, Sharkansky has produced
revised numerical values for the political subcultures
of the forty eight states with which he worked.

87

The

writer feels that these final numerical values assigned to
the states lead not only to greater flexibility in the
empirical study of political subcultures in the U.S., but
also to greater accuracy.

The final scores are shown in

Appendix D .
Political culture is measured in this study by the
revised scores which Sharkansky assigned to the American
states.

They are used as interval level variables.

^^Ibid., p. 117.
86

Gulture:

Sharkansky, "The Utility of Elazar*s Political
A Research Note," p. 71.

87
Sharkansky used the formula C = Sum c
n
'Where C stands for the average numerical value to be assigned
the state’s culture; c equals the value of each cultural
designation that Elazar assigns to sub-areas within a
state; and n equals the number of such designations within
the state."
See Sharkansky*s "The Utility of Elazar*s
Political Culture:
A Research Note," p. 71.

Political Participation
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This is a measure of the role the individual citizens
of the states play in the political process as measured
by the percentage of age-eligible voters who voted in the
89
presidential elections in 19 72, 1976, and 1980.
Welfare
It is the public policy of the states toward welfare
as measured by the average monthly payment per family in
dollars as Aid to Families with Dependent Children

(AFDC)

in 1972, 19 76, and 19 80.
Wealth
The wealth or affluence of the states is measured by
the per capita income in constant (19 72) dollars for the
states in 1972, 1976, and 1 9 8 0 . ^
Limitations of the Study
Sharkansky has identified seventeen regions in the
88
The raw data for political participation, wealth,
and welfare were extracted from the Statistical Abstract
of the United States.
These data are shown in Appendices A,
B and C.

89

Gubernatorial elections would have constituted an
ideal measure of voter turnout.
But some states elect their
officials in off-year elections and so are robbed of the
special stimulus which the presidential election years
generate.
This unequal stimulus would produce a voter
turnout based upon gubernatorial elections that are not
comparable for all the states.
See Tompkin's "A Causal
Model of State Welfare Expenditures," p. 398.
90

The per capita income in constant (19 72) dollars
for 19 76 was obtained by dividing the 19 76 per capita income
in current dollars by implicit price index for 1972 (1*321).
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U.S., 91 a departure from the six regions commonly used m
most social science literature.

Sharkansky*s classification,

however, appears superior as it takes care of the problem
of border states and includes geographically contiguous
states in the same region because regions are supposed to
share similar "historical experiences and contemporary
characteristics."

92

The result is a finer classification

of the states which better brings out variations among the
states and regions and so helps in determining the politics
and policies of the states with greater clarity.

This

clarity, according to Sharkansky, is enhanced when variables
are tested in all of the seventeen classifications.
The writer considers it cumbersome to test the variables
in all of the states in the seventeen regions of the U.S.
This thesis is limited, therefore, to the states in only
two of the regions— the Plains and Southeastern regions of
the U.S.— derived from the larger groupings of the North
Central and Southern regions respectively.

Because the

study is restricted to two regions that are not
representative samples,

(they do not even include the

individualistic subculture)

the results cannot be generalized

to all the states in the U.S.
91
pp.
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^ I b i d . , p. 18.
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DATA ANALYSIS, RESULTS, AND DISCUSSION
An examination of the raw data (see Appendix) shows
that the wealth and AFDC payments of all the states increase
with time.

Judging from Sharkansky1s subcultural values, all

the states in the Southeastern region are traditionalistic
and all the states in the Plains region are moralistic
except Missouri which is traditionalistic.

Sharkansky lists

Missouri as a border state under the Southern region which
may explain its traditionalistic subculture.

The

moralistic subcultures of Kansas and Nebraska are mitigated
by elements of individualism that tend to pull them towards
the latter.

It will be observed also that the states in the

Plains region are relatively more affluent and have higher
voter turnout and higher welfare payments than do states in
the Southeastern region.
However, a much more thorough and accurate analysis
of the data is derived from the statistical results shown
below.

The hypotheses are restated and the results of the

multiple regression and T-test performed are presented and
discussed with reference to these hypotheses.
Null Hypothesis
Political subculture makes an insignificant impact on
the welfare policies of the states in the Plains and
46
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Southeastern regions of the U.S. when compared to the impact
made by wealth and political participation.
The above hypothesis is tested by finding out whether
each of the independent variables accounts for a significant
explanation of welfare when the remaining two independent
variables are controlled.

The test is carried out by

calculating the F ratio for each of the variables for each
year from the multiple regression analysis.

Their levels of

significance are compared and that of political culture is
expected to be non-significant

(null hypothesis).

Results
Table-II
The Significance of Effects of Politial
Participation, Wealth, and Political
Culture on Welfare
(a) Controlling for Wealth and Political Culture
Year

R2 (Total)

1972
1976
1980

0. 818
0. 861
0.939

R

2

Change
0.019
0.002
0.002

F
1.57
0. 22
0.05

P
Not Significant
Not Significant
Not Significant

(b) Controlling for Political Participation and
Political Culture
1972
1976
1980

0. 818
0. 861
0.939

0.055
0.059
0.106

4. 53
6. 37
26.07

p < 0.05
p < 0,01
p < 0.01
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(c) Controlling for Political Participation and Wealth
1972
19 76
1980

0. 818
0. 861
0. 939

0.060
0.086
0.055

4.95
9.28
13.52

P < 0.05
P < 0.01
P < 0.01

Discussion
The null hypothesis is falsified.

Wealth and political

culture each make a significant independent impact upon
welfare while political participation does not.

This finding

implies that even if political participation were omitted as
an independent variable and a three-variable system or model
were used instead of a four-variable system, probably the
investigation would have suffered no serious loss, but not
so with wealth and political culture.

Perhaps the

significant impact political participation is found to make
on welfare in some studies could be explained by the fact
that political culture is not used as one of the variables
in these studies.

With the introduction of political culture,

which is believed to explain much of political participation,
the latter shows no significant independent influence on
welfare benefits.
Research Hypothesis
The impact of political subculture on the content of
welfare policies of the states in the Plains and Southeastern
regions of the U.S. exceeds that of either wealth or political
participation.
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The step taken in testing this hypothesis consists
of recording the standardized regression coefficients
(beta weights) between wealth and political culture as
independent variables while political participation is
treated as a dependent variable

(the indirect effects)

and the beta weights between each individual variable and
welfare

(the direct effects).

The effects coefficients

(total effects) of the variables are computed and the total
effects of political culture on welfare is expected to exceed
that of either wealth or political participation on welfare.
Results
Table III
The Indirect and Direct Effects of Wealth,
Culture, and Political Participation
on Welfare
(a) Beta weights between wealth, and political culture as
independent variables and political participation
treated as a dependent variable— the indirect
effects
Year
1972

1976

1980

Variables

Beta Weights

Wealth

0.09

Political Culture

0.90

Wealth

0.10

Political Culture

0.93

Wealth

0.13

Political Culture

0.95
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(b) Beta weights between each individual independent
variable and welfare— the direct effects
19 72

1976

1980

Wealth

0.25

Political Culture

0.53

Political Participation

0.29

Wealth

0.28

Political Culture

0.69

Political Participation

0.09

Wealth

0. 44

Political Culture

0.55

Political Participation

0.09

Discussion
The above results show that the research hypothesis is
supported.

An association of scores with the causal model

and the calculation of the effects coefficients will make
this fact more obvious.
For each of the three years, 19 72, 19 76, and 19 80, the
total effects coefficients of political culture substantially
exceeds those of wealth and political participation, those
of political participation being the least except in 19 72
when it equalled that of wealth.

From these results, the

writer concludes that political culture makes the greatest
impact upon the welfare policies of the states in the Plains
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(1972)

0.90

0.09

0.29

C

0.53

0.25

V

A
P
C
A
W

=
=
=
=

Political participation
Political culture
Welfare
Wealth

Total effect of C on A = 0.53 + 0 . 9 0 x 0.29 = 0.79
Total effect of W on A = 0.25 + 0 . 9 0 x .29 = 0.28
Effect of P on A = 0.29
Figure 2.

The Effects Coefficients of the Independent
Variables for 1972, 1976, and 1980.

(1976)

0.09

C

0.69

0.28

*
A
P
C
A
W

=
~
=
=

Political participation
Political culture
Welfare
Wealth

Total effect

of C on

A - 0.69

+ 0.93 x 0.09 =

0.77

Total effect

of W on

A = 0.28

+ 0.10 x 0.10 =

0.29

Total effect

of P on

A = 0.09

Figure 2 (continued). The Effects Coefficients of the
Independent Variables for 19 72, 19 76, and 19 80

(1980)
P

0.95

C

0.13

0.09

0.55

P
C
A
W

=
=
=
=

0.44

Political participation
Political culture
Welfare
Wealth

Total effect

of C on A = 0.55

+ 0.95 x 0.09 = 0. 64

Total effect

of W on A = 0.44

+ 0.13 x 0.09 = 0. 45

Total effect

of P on A = 0.09

Figure 2 (continued). The Effects Coefficients of the
Independent Variables for 19 72, 19 76, and 19 80
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and Southeastern regions of the U.S., followed by wealth,
with political participation making a negligible impact.
It will be observed that the confirmation of the
research hypothesis is consistent with Tompkins's finding
based on path analysis, that ethnicity is more important
in determining the amount paid as welfare benefits in the
American states than wealth or political competitionparticipation.
Subsidiary Hypothesis 1
The states that have moralistic

(M) political

subcultures will likely pay higher welfare benefits than
states with traditionalistic

(T) political subculture.

The comparative test which this hypothesis demands
is verified by running a T-test of the two main political
subcultures of the states under investigation against
welfare for 1972, 1976, and 1980.

The mean welfare payment

of the political subcultures are compared.

That of the

moralistic subculture is expected to be greater than that of
the traditionalistic subculture.
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Results
Table IV
The Significance of Differences in Welfare
Payments Between Moralistic and
Traditionalistic States

Year

Moralistic

Means
Traditionalistic

1972

186.17

105.92

1976

232.50

1980

280.50

T-Value

DF

P

5. 38

17

< 0.0009

126.38

5. 82

17

< 0.0009

151.62

6. 43

17

< 0.0009

Discussion
The comparative test of the magnitude of welfare
payments made by the states in the two political subcultures
shows very significant results.

The mean for the moralistic

subculture for each of the three years far exceeds that of
traditionalistic subculture, signifying that the states
with moralistic subculture pay higher welfare benefits than
the st&tes with traditionalistic subculture.
One may argue that the difference in the amount of
welfare benefits

paid

by these two subcultures is explained

by their difference in wealth instead.

But the statistical

results do not support this argument.

When political culture

and political participation are controlled, the influence
of wealth on welfare is minimal compared to that of political
culture on welfare when wealth and political participation are
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controlled.

In 1972, wealth explained only about 25 percent

of welfare policy variation whereas political culture
explained about 75 percent of the variation.

Besides, the

test of the research hypothesis shows that political culture
makes an impact on the welfare policies of the states under
investigation that far exceeds that made by wealth.

The

writer maintains, therefore, that the amount of welfare
benefits those states pay is contingent more upon their
political culture than upon their wealth.
Subsidiary Hypothesis 2
Political culture will likely have a greater impact
on political participation than wealth will.
To test this hypothesis involves only a comparison
of the beta weights between political culture and political
participation and that between wealth and political
participation.

These beta weights have been obtained already

in the previous tests.
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Results
Table V
The Comparative Influence of Political Culture
and Wealth on Political Participation
Political Culture Political
Participation

Ye ar

Wealth Political
Participation

1972

- 0.90

- 0.09

19 76

- 0.93

- 0.10

1980

- 0.95

- 0.13

Discussion
Comparing the beta weights between political culture
and political participation on the one hand and wealth and
political participation on the other, it becomes evident
that the reciprocal influence between political culture and
political participation is far greater than that between
wealth and political participation.

This result might stem

from the naturally greater affinity political participation
has for political culture than for wealth; political
participation is more a part of political culture than
wealth is.

CONCLUSION
Developing associations in pblicy studies has its
merits.

But more important than these associations is

developing and testing causal models.
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In the light of the

results of this study, grounds exist for questioning the
validity of studies that attribute the greatest environmental
influence on public policy to economic variables.

It appears

that the elevation of economic variables in many of these
studies is as a result of their "failure to fully develop
and test causal theories."

94

But even some studies that

employ improved methodologies have also concluded that
economic factors influence public policy most.

Michael

Lewis-Beck using the path analytic technique concludes
that:
When the effects coefficients for a common model of
welfare policy are estimated in a data-based example,
socioeconomic variables are found to be considerably
more important than political v a r i a b l e s . 95
However, in his model, Lewis-Beck did not examine the
independent influence of political culture.

Political

9 3Dye and Gray, p. 10.
94

Ibid.
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Michael S. Lewis-Beck, "The Relative Importance of
Socioeconomic and Political Variables for Public Policy,"
The American Political Science Review 71 (June 1977) :566.
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variables may not be very important in determining the content
of welfare policy; even this study reveals only a low
relationship between political participation and welfare
policy.

But another political variable— political culture—

appears to be in a class by itself and my study, based on
an improved methodology confirms its importance.

Further

study is still advisable in order to include more sophisticated
measures of participation as well as other variables that
might help explain policy.
The following conclusions could be drawn from this
study:

1) political culture is more important than wealth

and political participation in determining the content of
welfare policy in the states investigated; 2) wealth is
important but its importance is secondary to that of
political

culture; 3) political participation as

measured here seems unimportant.

The implications of these

conclusions suggest that one way to obtain more liberal
public policies is to first work to change culture.
Attempts could be made to inject the more "other regarding"
moralistic subculture into areas with individualistic
subculture.

A process of education and the mobilization

of groups in the traditionalistic areas who might have
moralistic tendency are lines of action that could be
taken to effect the desired change.
But the process of cultural change, noted for its
slowness, will not produce the quick results some of us
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might anticipate.

Since culture does not yield easily to

change, efforts to improve public policy content should also
concentrate on the economic variable which is subject to
government manipulation.

Finally,

realizing that

cultural change takes time, perhaps generations, and that
economic impacts are less effective, we need to exercise
patience and accept those public policy changes that do come
though they be smaller and slower than we might desire.
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APPENDIX A
Voter Turnout - Percentage of Age-Eligible
Voters Who Voted in Presidential Elections
States in the Plains Region

1972

1976

1980

Political
Culture

1.

Iowa

63.3

63.7

63.1

2.00

2.

Kansas

59.0

58.4

57.2

3.66

3.

Minnesota

68. 4

71. 4

70.6

1.00

4.

Missouri

57.5

57. 7

59. 1

7.66

5.. 7'Nebraska

56.0

56.1

57. 1

3.66

6.

North Dakota

67. 4

67.2

65.4

2.00

7.

South Dakota

68.8

63. 8

67.6

3.00

States in the Southeastern Region
8.

Alabama

43. 4

47.2

49.2

8.57

9.

Arkansas

48.1

52.2

51.9

9. 00

10.

Florida

49. 3

51.5

50.0

7. 80

11.

Georgia

37.9

43. 3

41. 8

8. 80

12.

Kentucky

48. 4

49.1

50.2

7. 40

13.

Louisiana

44. 3

49. 8

53. 9

8.00

14.

Mississippi

45. 0

49.5

52. 3

9. 00

15.

North Carolina

43. 4

44.1

44.0

8. 50

16.

South Carolina

38.6

41. 7

41.0

8. 75

17.

Tennessee

43. 6

49.6

49. 1

8. 50

18.

Virginia

45.5

47. 7

48.2

7. 86

19.

West Virginia

62. 4

58. 1

53.1

7. 33
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APPENDIX B
Wealth - Per Capita Income in Constant
(19 72) Dollars
States in the Plains Region

1972

Iowa

3,476 4, 874 5,232

2.00

Kansas

3,681 4,917 5,580

3.66

Minnesota

3,666 4,658 5,436

1.00

Missouri

3,564 4,546 5,021

7.66

Nebraska

3,411 4,724 5,234

3.66

North Dakota

3,118 4,088 4,891

2.00

South Dakota

2,949 3,631 4, 362

3.00

Alabama

2,963 3,864 4,186

8. 57

Arkansas

2,685 3, 840 4,062

9. 00

Florida

3,885 4,624 5,028

7. 80

Georgia

3, 380 4,217 4,512

8. 80

Kentucky

3,025 4,105 4,255

7. 40

Louisiana

2,876 4,077 4, 727

8. 00

Mississippi

2,497 3,463 3,677

9. 00

North Carolina

3,196 4,095 4,371

8. 50

South Carolina

2,925 3, 880 4,061

8. 75

Tennessee

3,099 4,112 4,315

8. 50

Virginia

3, 883 4,751

5,250

7. 86

West Virginia

2,962 4,083 4, 360

7. 33

1976

1980

Political
Culture

States in the Southeastern Region

66

APPENDIX C
Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC)
Average Monthly Payment Per Family in Dollars

States in the Plains Region

19 72

19 76

19 80

Political
Culture

Iowa

188

260

307

2.00

Kansas

19 3

226

271

3.66

Minnesota

234

264

336

1.00

Missouri

105

140

217

7. 66

Nebraska

149

204

274

3.66

North Dakota

185

238

277

2.00

South Dakota

168

203

218

3.00

75

103

110

8.57

112

122

145

9.00

Florida

97

12 7

175

7. 80

Georgia

100

96

133

8. 80

Kentucky

120

174

176

7. 40

Louisiana

91

121

147

8.00

Mississippi

53

48

88

9.00

North Carolina

114

155

16 4

8.50

South Carolina

81

86

10 7

8. 75

Tennessee

104

104

113

8.50

Virginia

168

192

214

7. 86

West Virginia

157

175

182

7. 33

States in the Southeastern Region
Alabama
Arkansas
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APPENDIX D
Political Culture Score of 4 8 U.S. States
as Modified by Sharkansky*
State

Score

State

Score

Alabama

;8. 57

Nebraska

3.66

Arizona

5.66

Nevada

3.00

Arkansas

9. 00

New Hampshire

2.33

California

3. 55

New Jersey

4.00

Colorado

1. 80

Nex Mexico

7.00

Connecticut

3. 00

New York

3.62

Delaware

7. 00

North Carolina

8. 50

Florida

7. 80

North Dakota

2.00

Georgia

8. 80

Ohio

5.16

Idaho

2. 50

Oklahoma

8. 25

Illinois

4. 72

Oregon

2.00

Indiana

6. 33

Pennsylvania

4.28

Iowa

2. 00

Rhode Island

3.00

Kansas

3. 66

South Carolina

8. 75

Kentucky

7. 40

South Dakota

3.00

Louisiana

8.00

Tennessee

8.50

Maine

2. 33

Texas

7. 11

Maryland

7. 00

Utah

2.00

Massachusetts

3.66

Vermont

2. 33

Michigan

2.00

Virginia

7. 86

Minnesota

1.00

Washington

1.66
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APPENDIX D (continued)
Political Culture Score of 48 U.S. States
as Modified by Sharkansky*

State

Score

State

Score

Mississippi

9.00

West Virginia

7. 33

Missouri

7.66

Wisconsin

2.00

Montana

3.00

Wyoming

4.00

*Ira Sharkansky, "The Utility of Elazar’s Political Culture:
A Research Note," p. 72.

